I.
BACKGROUND
On
a.
The Importance of Commerce
The
The
importance of the national sea port system is critical to the sustainability of
the
The
logistic responsibility of supplying stores and manufacturers would shift to
overland transportation systems and alternate sea ports, stressing both the
national highway and railway infrastructures as well as secondary ports in the
b.
Defining the Threats
The
nature of the maritime threat is not limited to the shores of the
In July
of this year Turkish security forces located and interdicted an al-Qaeda cell,
comprised mostly of Turkish citizens. The
Turks subsequently identified a boat docked in Alanya harbor packed with 400kg (880
lbs.) of TNT. The al-Qaida plan involved
using the TNT laden boat in an attack against an Israeli tourist liner. If such an attack occurred when the targeted
ocean liner is in the port channel, it could effectively shut down the port for
some time.
According
to an
As early
as the mid to late nineteen nineties, US forces have been exposed to maritime
threats abroad. On a narrow strip of
beach facing the
In January of 2000, al-Qaida
executed a plan to sink a
‘Trojan Horse’ shipping containers are a real
threat. Recently, a container was
examined and opened in the
Further,
there is the risk of using a shipping container as a weapon. Imagine the destructive force of a
twenty-foot container filled with TNT, ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel. The resultant explosion would be several
orders of magnitude higher than the
In summary, threats to US and
international ports fall into four categories:
i.
Direct attacks against vessels in ports,
including ‘human torpedo’ attacks as used in the USS Cole incident, including underwater
demolitions attacks against vessels, designed to spread fear and add to the
al-Qaeda body count,
ii.
Attacks against port infrastructure, such as
sinking a ship in the channel, designed to disrupt, halt, or slow the
operational efficiency of the port’s capability to delivery vital goods,
iii.
‘Trojan Horses’ containing operatives and
smuggled weapons, intended to carry out attacks on other non-maritime targets,
and
iv.
Radiological attacks, designed to irradiate and
subsequently close a port facility for the foreseeable future.
c.
Current Seaport Security
The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), through the US Coast Guard (USCG) and the Port
Security Grant Program, promotes, creates and assists ports security
development across the nation and overseas.
Domestically,
strong emphasis is placed on prevention and detection of explosive devices,
including nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons. Also, the focus of security forces is
directed toward improvised explosive devised delivered by small craft or underwater
operatives. Particular attention is
directed toward the protection of civilian cruise line, ferry terminals, and
civilian passenger liners in port.
Internationally,
the US Coast Guard trains foreign port security personnel at its training
facility in
d.
US Counterterrorism Policy
According
to the State Department,
i.
Make no concessions to terrorists and strike no
deals;
ii.
Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes;
iii.
Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor
terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and
iv.
Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of
those countries that work with the
Most
important to constructing a policy for maritime and port security are
objectives two and four. We shall interpret
the objective of bringing terrorists to justice to include direct interception
and interdiction of terror cells intent on attacking maritime targets, both
domestic and abroad. The objective to increase
the counterterrorism capabilities of foreign countries shall include US
commercial trading partners and strategic partners that slip US vessels,
commercial or military.
II. OPTIONS
FOR A MORE SECURE SUPPLY CHAIN
Clearly,
to protect the vital commercial infrastructure and prevent disruptions in the
national supply chain, the vulnerability of US ports must be addressed. The task of manually inspecting and securing each
and every cargo container in the nation is an exercise in futility. Therefore, we must examine the scope of our
vulnerability mitigation. Consider the
following spheres of operation.
a.
Defense: The Home Game
This
option places emphasis on protecting
The
US Coast Guard will require a massive budget increase as well. The current state of the USCG fleet is
decaying. Many of the seaworthy vessels
are old and require maintenance which places them out of operational readiness
for months out of the year. Additionally,
the USCG will require many more ‘fast-boats’, of small size, with which they
can conduct harbor patrols and rapidly respond to immediate waterborne threats.
In
order to detect NRBC devices, this policy calls for technology solutions to the
problem of examining so vast a quantity of cargo containers. A technology development grant will be
instituted which calls for a universal scanner which can be attached to dockside
cranes’ claws. This technology will scan
each container in the two minutes it spends in the clutches of the crane which
lifts it from the belly of the cargo ship.
US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) will administer and monitor the system.
In
short, this option requires an increase in personnel and materiel for
mitigating domestic port security risks.
i.
Benefits
1.
This policy would mitigate the effect of domestic
attacks and provide a bulwark against the many threats to which our ports are
exposed.
2.
Port security personnel will be more apparent to
terrorist surveillance teams and will serve as a deterrent.
3.
Most importantly, this policy will insure that
each and every container coming into the
ii.
Drawbacks
1.
The cost of upgrading the Coast Guard fleet will
be high.
2.
Many domestic port facility owners and operators
have little motive to increase security, and no knowledge of the Port Security
Grant Program.
3.
It will be some time before a nuclear material
detection capability can be applied to every dockside crane in the nation.
b.
Offense: The Away Game
A
policy converse to a domestically focused port security option is to encourage security
reforms inside foreign ports through foreign port security funding incentives, real-time
tracking of cargo containers, and direct training of foreign port security
personnel.
Incentives
can be offered to foreign ports if they pass operational security tests and meet
ICE defined accepted security benchmarks.
These tests may be conducted by private security companies, comprised of
ex-SEAL operators, specialized in maritime security and interdiction. The private security firm will provide an
independent audit of security protocols and capabilities, and offer
recommendations to ICE. ICE will then
impose restrictions on the port, or grant incentives based on each security
situation.
Tracking
devices based on GPS technology are beginning to appear on individual
containers. These are supplied and
placed by the various private cargo carriers in order to track shipments more
efficiently. A program to supply and
monitor these devices through an international security clearing house is the
goal of this international policy. Interpol
will receive funds from ICE to house and administer the system. ICE executive personnel will participate in
every phase of the programs implementation and operation.
Training
of the foreign port personnel may be conducted by ICE qualified and approved US
private security firms whose operational specialization involves port and
maritime security. The funds for the
training will come from the foreign government and will be matched by ICE. The resultant increase in the awareness and
capability of foreign port security personnel will add another layer of defense
to our domestic maritime assets.
i.
Benefits
1.
The economic incentives for meeting security
requirements will stimulate agreement and cooperation among international port
security services.
2.
ICE
involvement in the Interpol container tracking system will increase our
intelligence gathering capability; we will be able to monitor any transport
container anywhere in the world.
3.
Training foreign port security personnel through
private contractors will be financially economical and will increase our human
intelligence resource pool.
ii.
Drawbacks
1.
The amount of time it may take to implement the
container tracking system dictates a lengthy operational cycle.
2.
Vulnerabilities yet remain among inland
waterways, i.e. ‘Euro-Barges’ are largely unmonitored and travel between
nations without inspection.
3.
The foreign-based emphasis of this policy takes
assets and resources away from domestic port security and preparedness.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Reiterating
the two key objectives of a comprehensive
This
offers us the opportunity to solve the problem of funding both areas of
operation. Should we split the available
funds right down the middle, or is there a compromise which will help us to mitigate
the risk of port infrastructure and maritime attacks domestically and
abroad? Consider the following proposal.
I
recommend a two-pronged approach to the problem. Domestically, we must prepare and equip our
Coast Guard to prevent and interdict hostiles in US ports. We must also provide a method of screening
cargo containers for nuclear material.
Internationally, we must enhance the coordination and training of
foreign port security services, develop a method of tracking of cargo
containers, and maintain an interdiction capability.
i.
The Domestic Plan
1.
Operative Training of
We
can save on the costs associated with the domestic ports security plan
implementation by leveraging our ports’ human resources. That is, we can recruit, screen and train
USCG maintenance personnel, tug-boat operators, and long-shore men to act as
deputized anti-terrorism agents. These
operators would function as normal in their primary roles, but would have a
secondary function as ‘incident response agents’. This will allow us to spend more money on
the physical assets required to refit the USCG with new fast-boats and
counterterrorism equipment.
2.
Enable the ‘Total Screen’ Concept
It
will be the objective of this policy to develop a system, attached to dockside container
crane claws, which can scan every container that is plucked from a cargo
hold. This will ensure that we can
identify any potential radiological threat.
Future upgrades to the system could make it possible to scan for
chemical and biological weapons, human cargo, and illicit drugs.
ii.
Expansion of the International Security
Network
The
second prong of this policy involves international training of port security
forces in strategic trading ports, and implementing a system of tracking cargo
containers worldwide. This will require
international cooperation and the US State Department will be tasked with
opening the political inroads which will facilitate this mission of the policy.
1.
Train the Trainers
We
will undertake the training of foreign port security forces through the use of
US-based, private security contractors.
The host governments will be required to fund the training, pass
readiness tests, and meet ICE determined benchmarks for port security. Failure to implement the security protocols
determined by ICE will result in trade restrictions on shipments originating
from that port.
2.
Worldwide Tracking System
This
policy sets the ambitious goal of creating a worldwide tracking system for cargo
containers. We currently track gypsy
freighters and suspect vessels, but the containers may go onto and off of rogue
ships and legitimate trading vessels several times prior to landing on US
soil. We must address this problem
through a technology based tracking system for cargo containers. The system will be chartered under Interpol
and administered through the ICE as described above.
3.
Open water Interdiction
The
cost of maintaining a foreign interdiction capability will be leveraged via use
of US Navy Special Warfare Development Group assets.
This
dual approach should accomplish the aforementioned goals of this foreign policy
while keeping costs from skyrocketing. It
is important to address threats prior to their arrival at US ports. Therefore, the international prong of this
strategy will require more emphasis in the future.
For
now, our efforts should yield a solid domestic counterterrorism and port
security capability. In the long run,
the objective will be to export our solid domestic port security measures to
overseas ports. This will effectively
create two front line defenses in the War on Maritime Terror.
The
agenda has been set. The risks are real
and terrible. Let us protect our ports
with the same vigor with which we have pursued the War on Terror. Certainly, US ports and the maritime environment
will be the next battlefield in that war.
IV. REFERENCES
1)
Barnett, Thomas P.M., The Pentagon’s New Map.
2)
Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book.
3)
Coast Guard Magazine Staff, “Coast guard Special
Missions Training”. Coast Guard
Magazine,
4)
DEBKAfile Staff,
“Palestinians and al-Qaeda Bond through Ship Container”.
5)
Department of Homeland Security, FY 2005 Port
Security Grant Program.
6)
Flynn,
7)
Glubb, John Bagot, A Short History of the Arab
Peoples.
8)
Harrald, J.R.,
Stephens, H.W., Van Dorp, J.R., “A Framework for Sustainable Port
Security”. Journal of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management, Vol. 1, Issue 2, Article 12, 2004.
9)
Pfarrer, Chuck, Warrior
Soul.
10)
Smith, Charles R.,
“Al Qaeda Plans Underwater Attack”.
NewsMax.com,
11)
Thayer, Charles W., Guerilla.
12)
Wine, Adam, “New
technology increases shipping traffic safety”. Coast Guard Magazine,