Evolving Terrorist Tactics---Some Lessons from Iraq
A friend of mine is retired from the Special Forces and is also a
professional trainer. He currently is working as a contractor doing
executive protection in Iraq. In September, he was back in the United
States for a one-month "R&R" rotation. While here, he related the
following to one of my contacts who has considerable military experience
and who assists in his training when my friend is not working as a
contractor overseas.
My friend indicates that the terrorists in Iraq have continued to
display their pattern of closely observing their targets and adapting
their tactics in an attempt to defeat their defenses. Lately, they have
evolved two new tactics that are not contained on the al-Qaeda videos.
These are:
1. The use of belt-fed light machineguns and RPGs in attacking
convoys and other targets. In the al-Qaeda videos there was some use of
RPGs, but many of the ambush and other scenarios depicted in the tapes
emplyoed AK-47s, pistols and grenades. The terrorists seem to have
learned that assaults using these "lighter" small arms are not always
effective against moving automobiles and other targets of opportunity.
The terrorists are now using belt fed light machineguns against their
targets. These weapons fire more powerful cartridges, offer greater
penetration and are effective at longer range. There has been a great
deal of development in light machineguns since the Germans first
introduced them in WWII, and current versions are truly portable using a
two-person team. At times, even a single person can use them
effectively. My friend was first confronted by this "new" weapon a few
months ago when his winshield suddenly exploded. Fortunately, he and
his crew were able to escape serious injury. As for RPGs, they were
used successfully in the attack against the Blackwater Team in Fallujah,
and have apparently become a major element in the terrorist's arsenal
for use against vehicles. Of course, roadside improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) are also still quite popular with the terrorists.
One concern that I have with terrorism here at home is that
American law enforcement officers are not trained to deal with assaults
that employ these types of weapons. This year's National Tactical
Invitational included an open-field counter-terrorism exercise. The
scenario involved a single participant using live fire to engage
multiple RPG-armed terrorist targets in an open field. In order to
properly engage the targets on the left and shoot around hostages, the
participant needed to move left and seek a better angle of fire by
taking cover behind an simulated automobile. In the previous year's
NTI, the same exercise was performed, so the participant knew the
drill. However, this year one of the RPG's had a rocket motor attached
to it and was fired at the cover vehicle, guided by a wire. I and the
NTI participants from the military all immediately moved away from the
car and sought alternate cover as soon as we saw the RPG coming. The
participants from law enforcement generally stayed with the car and
tried to return fire, taking the full effect of the RPG. Clearly, they
dealt with the RPG as if it were incoming rifle or pistol fire, and they
would have likely been killed if they were trying to use an automobile
to provide cover from a real incoming RPG.
I don't know how likely it is that terrorist cells in the U.S.
will be able to acquire RPGs and light machine guns. However, the
borders are still fairly porous and one should expect that these types
of weapons may be included in their tactics for use against appropriate
targets that the terrorists consider to be high value in the United
States. I'm sure they will also attempt to use car bombs and other IEDs
as well. However, I don't believe that they can be expected to simply
continue to employ their traditional methods without some improvisation.
2. The second scenario is the non-appointment. My friend's
principal was invited to an "important" meeting and his team executed a
routine transit plan. They planned their route and used a
counter-sniper team to establish surveillance prior to entering the
building. When they arrived, they found that the meeting had been
"cancelled" without notice. As the counter-sniper team was coming down
from its position and as the principal's party was about to exit the
building the same way it had entered, my friend suddenly had second
thoughts. He sent the counter-sniper team back up for one last check of
the neighborhood, and they immediately spotted an ambush being set up
along the the proposed route of exit. It seems as if the terrorists had
learned that American contract protective details often leave the scene
of a meeting along familiar ground... which is the route by which they
came. The terrorists also evidently learned to observe the
counter-sniper teams. The terrorists apparently had watched them
carefully and had waited until the counter-sniper team stood down before
setting up the ambush. My friend quickly improvised and executed an
alternate egress and avoided the ambush.
Counter measures: All of this reinforces what we already know
about terrorists. They continually observe their targets and refine
their tactics on an on-going basis. One simply can't assume that just
having a well thought-out set of counter measures in place will
permanently offer sufficient protection. Any specific set of counter
measures will be valid for only a limited time before terrorists uncover
and take advantage of the counter measures' vulnerabilities. Continual
assessment and reassessment of the terrorists' capabilities and constant
updating of measures and counter measures for dealing with the
terrorists seems to be the best way for a potential target to avoid
attack. If avoidance is not possible, continually updating one's
proceedures will at least give a person the flexibility of several
routes of movement and, if necessary the ability to engage the terrorist
on terms that are unfavorable to him.
As a behavioral scientist, I've come to believe that today's
terrorists, even those who not possess advanced educations, have highly
developed performance I.Q.s which allow them to visualize what their
intended victims are doing and quickly understand and analyze the
behavior and vulnerabilities of their intended targets. Analyzing
terrorist behavior in the terms of Col. John Boyd's OODA Loop indicates
that the terrorists have excellent abilities to Observe the target,
Orient themselves to its behavior, Decide on a course of action from
multiple pre-learned or improvised scenarios, and Act seamlessly to
flexibly implement their chosen course of action before the target can
modify its actions and protect itself. Students of Boyd refer to this
process as "getting inside your opponent's loop." The best way to
prevent terrorists from doing this seems to be for the intended target
to change its loop faster than the terrorist can respond. To do this,
one has to look critically at one's own behavior from the eyes of one's
enemy and, with an understanding of the enemy's capabilities, both
present and potential, modify one's own behavior so as to become
unpredictable.