'Al Qaeda' Training Manual Deconstructed
Summary
A new Arabic-language periodical from an al Qaeda-affiliated
organization has appeared on the Web. While it complements other
similar documents published electronically by jihadist forces, it
also provides a few insights into the jihadist network's
operations in Saudi Arabia. This particular Web magazine sheds
light on the non-military apparatus of al Qaeda and how it aids
in the training of militant Islamists.
Analysis
A group referring to itself as the Military Committee of the
Mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula has published a new
electronic periodical called Maaskar al-Bataar (Al-Bataar
Training Camp).
The publication of Maaskar al-Bataar sometime after Jan. 1 is not
a dramatic development, but it offers some insight into the
manner in which al Qaeda is operating in Saudi Arabia. A group
affiliated with al Qaeda published this particular periodical,
which offers clues to those operations of the jihadist network
that facilitate its continued ability to stage military
operations.
Placed in context with the plethora of purportedly al Qaeda-
linked e-mail and Web postings, al-Maaskar al-Bataar is just
another piece of the body of jihadist work on the Net. The
posting is put together skillfully, but is not very different
from what these groups usually churn out, such as an older
magazine called Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad).
On the other hand, the document suggests there is a cadre of
Arabs (likely Saudis) with computer skills and the ability to
freely produce such works. They clearly have secure locations in
the kingdom, or perhaps the peninsula, from which they can
publish material of decent structural quality. Undoubtedly, these
are individuals who have access to hardware and software, along
with the freedom of movement to put it together. From the logic
of demand and supply, it also appears there is an audience for
such publications. Otherwise, a group that is trying to sustain
operations and avoid penetration by authorities would not invest
so much time, energy and resources, which put it at risk of
detection.
Document Structure
The original document was in PDF format and used fancy Arabic
fonts, footnotes and graphics. This is different from the usual
e-mails and Web postings from Osama bin Laden and others. This is
the second edition of the magazine for the month of Ziqaad 1424
A.H. (in accordance with the Islamic lunar calendar), and has six
articles.
Content
The magazine contains mostly information about military
operations. It is named after Sheikh Yousef al-Ayyiri, who went
by the nom de guerre of al-Bataar. Al-Ayyiri at one point
allegedly served as bin Laden's bodyguard. He is believed to have
died in a shootout with Saudi security forces sometime in 2003.
According to the editor, Abi Thabit al-Najdi, Maaskar al-Bataar
intends to impart a culture of jihad among Arab Muslim youth and
prepare them to fight against those who have "invaded the Islamic
world." Al-Najdi claims the journal circumvents obstacles in the
Muslim world put in place by governments that have allied with
the "crusaders." It is meant to prepare mujahideen for jihad;
under the current circumstances they cannot undergo conventional
training. The script contains a rudimentary regimen of lessons in
physical exercise, the use of light weapons, guerrilla and
survival tactics in urban and rural areas and tips about security
and intelligence.
The first article after al-Najdi's editorial introduction was
penned by Sheikh Abdullah al-Rasheed, exhorting Muslims to wage
jihad. Next is a piece by al-Baraa al-Qahtani talking about the
AK-47 Kalashnikov assault rifle. This is followed by an essay by
al-Ayyiri pertaining to the importance of sports. Other entries
cover guerrilla warfare and the religious underpinnings a fighter
must keep in mind while performing his tasks. The most striking
article allegedly was written by al Qaeda's current No. 3 man,
Saif al-Adel, who is rumored to be hiding in Iran; it talks about
the importance of maintaining operational security.
Audience
Published in Arabic, the magazine clearly is meant for Arab
Muslim youth willing to join the ranks of militants. It makes use
of information regarding ideas and individuals known in Islamist
circles, meaning this is not intended for the uninitiated. In one
sense, this is the work of individuals who are somewhat amateur
militants. The apex leadership of al Qaeda would not publish such
a document for fear of being traced.
In other words, this document is more sophisticated than the
normal crude messages from al Qaeda, which is a sign that the
jihadists in Saudi Arabia are more autonomous in their activities
-- confirming our earlier impressions that al Qaeda is more like
a franchise-based corporation than a typical paramilitary
organization. It also would appear that al Qaeda, bin Laden,
Ayman al-Zawahiri and others serve as symbols for at least some
jihadists in the kingdom and, organizationally, enjoy some form
of autonomy.
Although this particular magazine aims to offer a modicum of
training information to those who sign up as militants, the
proliferation of such magazines likely will lead to an increase
in the number of youth willing to join the ranks of the
jihadists. What is difficult to gauge is the number of people who
are part of the non-military support apparatus of the jihadist
network. There are likely to be future editions of this magazine
-- unless Saudi authorities track down the publishing office
before that.
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